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Abstract
The Preˆt a` Voter election scheme provides high as-
surance of accuracy and secrecy, due to the high de-
gree of transparency and auditability. However, the as-
surance arguments are subtle and involve some under-
standing of the role of cryptography. As a result, estab-
lishing public understanding and trust in such systems
there remains a challenge. It is essential that a voting
system be not only trustworthy but also widely trusted.
In response to this concern, we propose to add a
mechanism to Preˆt a` Voter to generate a conventional
(i.e. human readable) paper audit trail that can be in-
voked should the outcome of the cryptographic count
be called into question. It is hoped that having such a
familiar mechanism as a safety net will encourage pub-
lic confidence. Care has to be taken to ensure that the
mechanism does not undermine the carefully crafted in-
tegrity and privacy assurances of the original scheme.
We show that, besides providing a confidence build-
ing measure, this mechanism brings with it a number
of interesting technical features: it allows extra audits
of mechanisms that capture and process the votes to be
performed. The mechanism proposed also has the bene-
fit of providing a robust counter to the danger of voters
undermining the receipt-freeness of property by trying
to retain the candidate list. Furthermore, we show how
the paper audit trail can be extended with cryptographic
elements that ensure the integrity of the paper trail and
allow for the safe use of voting machines with a touch-
screen user interface.
1 Introduction
There has been much concern lately as to the trust-
worthiness of electronic voting systems such as touch
screen devices, where the integrity of the count depends
heavily on the correctness of the code running on the
voting machines. Researchers have pointed out the ease
with which the count could be manipulated in virtually
undetectable ways, [7]. One response to these concerns,
originally proposed by Mercury [9], is to incorporate a
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail, essentially a paper
copy of the voter’s intent that is printed in the booth
and checkable by the voter. Whilst such a mechanism
is doubtless an improvement on the situation in which
the count is retained solely in software, with no paper
back-up at all, there are still problems:
• Paper audit trails are not invulnerable to corrup-
tion.
• If the paper record does not agree with the voter’s
selection, it may be tricky to resolve, especially
without undermining the privacy of the ballot.
• It is not clear under what circumstances the audit
trail should be invoked.
• It is not clear how any conflicts between the com-
puter and paper audit counts should be resolved.
• Humans are notoriously bad at proof-reading, es-
pecially their own material, and hence bad at de-
tecting errors in a record of their choices, [3].
An alternative response is to devise schemes that
provide high levels of assurance via a high degree of
transparency and with minimal dependency on tech-
nology. Such schemes provide Voter-verifiability in a
different sense: voters have a way to confirm that their
vote is included in a universally auditable tabulation
that is performed on an append-only Web Bulletin
Board (WBB).
Preˆt a` Voter, [16, 17, 1, 14], is a particularly voter-
friendly example of such high assurance, trustworthy
voting schemes. It aims to provide guarantees of accu-
racy of the count and ballot privacy that are indepen-
dent of software, hardware etc. Assurance of accuracy
flows from maximal transparency of the process, con-
sistent with maintaining ballot privacy.
Verifiable schemes like Preˆt a` Voter, VoteHere, [10],
and PunchScan, [5], arguably provide higher levels of
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assurance than even conventional pen-and-paper elec-
tions, and certainly far higher assurance than systems
that are dependant on the correctness of (often pro-
prietary) code. However, the assurance arguments are
subtle and it is unreasonable to expect the electorate at
large to follow them. Whether the assurances of experts
would be enough to reassure the various stakeholders
is unclear. This is probably especially true during the
early phase of introduction of such systems until a track
record has been established. It seems sensible therefore
to explore the possibility of incorporating more conven-
tional mechanisms to support public confidence.
Randell and Ryan, [12], explored the possibility of
voter-verifiable schemes without the use of cryptogra-
phy. This tried to achieve similar integrity, verifiablity
and privacy goals but using only more familiar, phys-
ical mechanisms such as scratch strips. The resulting
levels of assurance, in the technical sense, are not as
high as for Preˆt a` Voter.
A more recent proposal is ThreeBallot due to Rivest,
[13]. This does indeed provide voter-verifiability but
at the cost of a non-trivial voter interface: voters a re-
quired to mark three ballots with in such a way as to
encode their vote (two votes against their candidate of
choice, one against all others) and to retain one ballot,
chosen at random. Besides the non-trivial voter inter-
face, a number of vulnerabilities in ThreeBallot have
been identified, several identified in Rivest’s original
paper. It is probably fair to conclude that ThreeBal-
lot, whilst being a conceptual breakthrough, does not,
as it stands, provide a viable scheme for real elections.
Here we explore a rather different route: supple-
menting a cryptographic scheme with a conventional
paper audit trail backup. Introducing such a mecha-
nism may introduce certain vulnerabilities not present
in the original scheme. However, it may be argued that
it is worth introducing such risks, at least during trials
and early phases of deployment. In this paper we pro-
pose an approach that we believe minimises such risks
whilst maximising the reassurance of having a conven-
tional mechanism as a backup. Once sufficient levels of
trust and confidence have been established in a verifi-
able, trustworthy schemes like Preˆt a` Voter, we would
hope that the scaffolding of a human-readable paper
audit trail could be cast aside.
An additional and unexpected benefit of the ap-
proach of this paper is to provide a robust counter to
the coercion threats arising from voters attempting to
leave the polling station with the left hand element of
the Preˆt a` Voter ballot. This shows the candidate or-
der and so could provide a potential coercer with proof
of the vote. A number of possible counter-measures
to this threat have been identified previously, for ex-
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Figure 1. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
ample the provision of decoy candidate lists, but the
mechanism here appears to be particularly robust.
The second author previously proposed a Verified
Encrypted Paper Audit Trail (VEPAT) mechanism,
[18]. Whilst this enhances assurance from a techni-
cal point of view, the audit trail is not human-readable
and so it does not really help with public perception
and confidence. It is hoped that the scheme proposed
here should be more familiar and understandable.
1.1 The contents of this paper
In Section 2 we introduce the background to Preˆt a`
Voter and the tools used in the proposed scheme, de-
tailed in Section 3. An extension for use in the touch
screen setup is introduced in Section 4 and a brief dis-
cussion concludes in Section 5.
2 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter
The key innovation of the Preˆt a` Voter approach is
to encode the vote using a randomised candidate list.
Suppose that our voter is called Anne. At the polling
station, Anne chooses at random a ballot form sealed
in an envelope; an example of such a form is shown in
Figure 1.
In the booth, Anne extracts her ballot form from
the envelope and makes her selection in the usual way
by placing a cross in the right hand column against
the candidate of her choice (or, in the case of a Sin-
gle Transferable Vote (STV) system for example, she
marks her ranking against the candidates). Once her
selection has been made, she separates the left and
right hand strips along a thoughtfully provided per-
foration and discards the left hand strip. She is left
with the right hand strip which now constitutes her
privacy protected receipt, as shown in Figure 2.
Anne now exits the booth clutching her receipt, reg-
isters with an official, and casts her receipt. Her receipt
is placed over an optical reader or similar device that
records the random value at the bottom of the strip
and records in which cell her X is marked. Her origi-
nal, paper receipt is digitally signed and franked and
returned to her to keep.
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Figure 2. Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt (encoding
a vote for "Idefix")
The randomisation of the candidate list on each bal-
lot form ensures that the receipt does not reveal the
way she voted, so ensuring the secrecy of her vote. In-
cidentally, it also removes any bias towards the candi-
date at the top of the list that can occur with a fixed
ordering.
The value printed on the bottom of the receipt, that
we refer to as the onion, is the key to extraction of
the vote during the tabulation phase. Buried cryp-
tographically in this value is the information needed
to reconstruct the candidate order and so extract the
vote encoded on the receipt. This information is en-
crypted with secret keys shared across a number of
tellers. Thus, only a threshold set of tellers acting to-
gether are able to interpret the vote encoded on the
receipt.
After the election, voters (or perhaps proxies act-
ing on their behalf) can visit the secure Web Bulletin
Board (WBB) and confirm their receipts appear cor-
rectly. Once any discrepancies are resolved, the tellers
take over and perform anonymising mixes and decryp-
tion of the receipts. All the intermediate stages of this
process are committed to the WBB for later audit. Var-
ious auditing mechanisms are in place to ensure that
all the steps, the creation of the ballot forms, the mix-
ing and decryption etc are performed correctly. These
are carefully designed so as not to impinge on ballot
privacy. Full details can be found in, for example, [19]
2.1 Preˆt a` Voter 2005 and 2006
The original Preˆt a` Voter system used a decryption
mix network to break the link between an encrypted
receipt and the plaintext vote [1]. We call this con-
figuration of the system Preˆt a` Voter 2005. When
the decryption mix network was exchanged for a re-
encryption mix network in Preˆt a` Voter 2006 [15] this
made provisions for a range of measures that protect
the secrecy of the election, for example the on-demand
printing of ballot forms in the booth. A further exten-
sion of the system exchanged the Elgamal encryption
for Paillier [14].
The addition of the paper audit trail proposed here
is made to Preˆt a` Voter 2006 and thus leaves in place all
the desirable properties of this system whilst making
use of the re-encryption properties of either Elgamal or
Pallier.
2.2 Human readable paper audit trail
Whilst there appear to be sound technical argu-
ments to show that cryptographic voting schemes like
Preˆt a` Voter can provide higher levels of assurance of
accuracy than traditional paper ballot systems, it is
often argued that a paper trail that can be manually
counted by humans should be available if the wish to
do a manual recount arises. It should be recognised
though that hand counting paper ballots will inevitably
involve some degree of error, even ignoring the possibil-
ity of malicious manipulation of ballots. It is extremely
rare for recounts to yield the same result. Typically
such errors fall comfortably within the winning margin
so are not a cause for concern. This does however mean
that it would be unreasonable to expect an electronic
and hand count to agree exactly, even if we suppose
the electronic count were exact.
The voter verifiability of Preˆt a` Voter allows all vot-
ers to check that their votes were recorded as intended
by the electronic voting system and then the public
verifiability allows any interested organisation or indi-
vidual to check that all recorded, encrypted votes are
transformed into countable plain text votes correctly.
The latter is fully auditable because of the cryptogra-
phy used but the previous is dependent on a certain
number of voters checking their receipts on a web site.
Introducing a paper audit trail allows a public check of
a fairly large number of these receipts.
2.3 Cryptographically verifiable paper audit trail
When a paper audit trail is introduced it is of course
the case that someone might tamper with the paper au-
dit trail to lessen public trust in the electronic system.
Therefore it is not simply a case of printing the plain
text votes onto paper but that which is printed on pa-
per must also be verifiable. In the proposed scheme we
show how it is possible to devise a human readable pa-
per audit trail such that each ballot form in that paper
trail can be verified to be in the plain text output from
the electronic scheme without jeopardising the secrecy
of the election.
2.4 Threshold probabilistic encryption scheme
Preˆt a` Voter 2006 [15] uses Elgamal onions where
the plaintext is encrypted under the public key of the
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tellers and a subset of these have to participate in the
decryption. Thus, a threshold probabilistic encryption
scheme is used in Preˆt a` Voter 2006 and we will use this
primitive here also. This is to ensure that the trust is
distributed among a set of parties. Thus for example,
we might use a (20, 10) which means that the secret key
is distributed amongst 20 tellers in such a way that any
subset of at least 10 of them can perform he decryption.
Any smaller set will be unable to decrypt or to obtain
any useful information about the value of the key.
2.5 Plaintext equivalency test
A plaintext equivalency test (PET) is an algorithm
which allows a threshold set of key share holders to
determine that two (randomised) ciphertexts have the
same plaintext and to prove this without revealing the
plaintext or their key shares. Its use in the proposed
scheme underpins a novel auditing approach to the pa-
per trail.
2.6 Zero-knowledge proofs
Cut-and-chooose protocols involve generating sur-
plus ciphertexts, auditing a randomly selected subset
and discarding the audited elements, as their cover has
been blown. A more subtle way of establishing confi-
dence in a claim, for example that a given ciphertext
really is an encryption of a claimed plaintext, is to use
zero-knowledge proofs.
An interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) is a
protocol in which one party, the prover P, demonstrates
the truth of a claim or knowledge of a fact to another,
the verifier V, without V learning anything other than
the truth of the statement or claim. Such protocols
typically involve a sequence of random challenges is-
sued by the verifier to the prover.
A typical example of such a protocol is the Chaum-
Pedersen protocol, [2] that is designed to prove plain-
text equivalence of a pair of ElGamal encryptions with-
out revealing either the plaintext, the secret key or the
re-randomising factor. This situation crops up where
a server has performed a re-encryption on an ElGamal
ciphertext and wants to prove the correctness without
revealing either the plaintext or the re-randomisation
factor.
Suppose that P presents V with a pair of ElGamal
ciphertexts (y1, y2) and (z1, z2) and claims that they
are related by a re-encryption. They can both compute
w := z1/y1 and u := z2/y2. Now the truth of the claim
that they are related by re-encryption is equivalent to
showing that (α, β, w, u) is a DDH tuple, i.e., ∃ x and
k such that w = αx, u = αx·k and β = αk. Here, k
is thought of as the secret ElGamal key and x the re-
encryption factor. Where the prover P is a mix server
demonstrating plaintext equivalence, P will know the
re-encryption factor x but not the decryption key k.
The three step protocol follows the standard pattern
for ZK proofs: P generates some fresh randomness, s,
that serves to blind the secret and makes a commitment
to s. V responds with a random challenge, c, to which
P can respond in a way that verifiable by V , only if
the secret value x exists and is known to P .
1. s ∈ Z∗q : P → V : (a, b) := (αs, βs)
2. c ∈ Z∗q : V → P : c
3. P → V : t = s+ c.x
Now V can check:
αt = a.wc and βt = b.uc
Informally, we see that the secret, random factor s
chosen by P serves to conceal the secret value x from
V . If P does not know x, or indeed, the claimed equiv-
alence is false and such an x does not exist, it will be
virtually impossible him, aside from an absurdly lucky
guess, to respond to v’s challenge value c with a value
t that will pass V ’s checks.
A variant of this protocol can be used to demon-
strate the correctness of a claimed decryption of a given
ElGamal ciphertext. Again, the proof can reduced to
the proof of a DDH tuple. In this case, P knows k but
not the randomising factor x so we simply interchange
their role in the protocol. Suppose that we have the El-
Gamal ciphertext (y1, y2) = (αk,m.βk) and P claims
that this decrypts to m′. To check that m = m′ we re-
quire P prove that the tuple (α, β, y1, y2/m′) is a DDH
tuple, which it will be if and only if m = m′.
A similar protocol to prove correct decryption of a
Paillier ciphertext can be found at [4] in the case in
which the prover knows the randomisation. For Pail-
lier it turns out that knowledge of the secret key allows
the prover to recover the randomisation as well as the
plaintext. Thus there is no need for a separate proto-
col for the case in which the prover is ignorant of the
randomisation. This is in contrast to ElGamal, where
knowledge of the secret key does not help recovering
the randomisation.
3 The scheme
In this section we first present the Preˆt a` Voter ballot
form with its onions and how they are created and
printed. We then describe the on-demand printing of
the candidate list and the method by which votes are
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POST
onionL
serial
RETAIN
onionR
Table 1. The ballot form in two pages
RETAIN
onionL onionR
serial
Table 2. The ballot form complete
cast. Finally we show how the encrypted receipts are
decrypted and how the human readable paper trail can
be used to verify the electronic election.
3.1 The ballot form and its use
The ballot form is altered to have two pages. The
bottom page has two portions. The left hand porion
carries an onion and a serial number. The top page
overlays the right column of the bottom sheet and car-
ries another onion value. The top page has a carbon
layer or similar on the back to ensure that marks ap-
plied to the top page transfer to the bottom page. The
layout of the ballot form is shown in Table 1. This
means that when the top page is aligned over the right
column of the bottom page the complete ballot form
looks as shown in Table 2. When the voter makes her
mark in the right hand column of this complete form
the mark is made on both pages.
The reader will notice that there are no candidate
names printed in Table 1. This is because we are in-
corporating the on-demand printing of ballot forms in-
troduced in previous papers. When the voter has iden-
RETAIN
candidateB
candidateC
candidateA
onionL onionR
serial
Table 3. The ballot form with candidates
printed
RETAIN
candidateB
candidateC X
candidateA
onionL onionR
serial
Table 4. The ballot form with marks
POST
candidateB
candidateC X
candidateA
onionL
serial
RETAIN
X
onionR
Table 5. The marked ballot form in two pages
tified herself to the poll station workers she is allowed
to randomly choose a ballot form such as that in Table
2. At this stage onionL and onionR are concealed by
for example a scratch strip so that they cannot be read
by either the poll station worker nor anyone else at the
polling station. The other value, serial, is noted in the
register next to the voter’s name. The voter takes the
form into the voting booth where she makes onionL
visible and then allows a machine to read this value.
The machine obtains a decryption of the onion, as will
be explained below, and from this computes the candi-
date list, which it now prints in the left column of the
ballot form. The result is depicted in Table 3.
The voter now makes her mark(s) on the form in
the privacy of the voting booth and the result is ex-
emplified in Table 4. She then detaches the top page
from the bottom and the result is shown in Table 5.
The voter places the page marked POST into an en-
velope through which only the serial number is visible
and then leaves the booth carrying the envelop and
the top page, which will constitute her receipt. She
now presents herself to the vote casting desk and hands
over the envelop and receipt. The poll station worker
has checks that serial is the same as the one previ-
ously assigned to the voter. Once this is done, the
serial number is detached and discarded and the enve-
lope containing the lower page is placed in the ballot
box. The page marked RETAIN is scanned, a digital
copy posted to the WBB and handed back to the the
voter to keep as her protected receipt.
The serial number serves a dual purpose here: firstly
it counters chain-voting attacks as suggested by Jones,
[6]. Secondly, it serves to verify that the voter does
not retain the lower layer of their ballot form. This
is a useful spin-off of the HRPAT mechanism: in the
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standard Preˆt a` Voter, there is the possibility of the
voter retaining the LH portion of the ballot form, along
with her receipt, to prove to a coercer how she voted.
3.2 The relationship between the two onions
As in Preˆt a` Voter 2006 with on-demand printing,
onionL is decrypted in order to reveal the candidate
list that can then be printed onto the ballot form. In
contrast to Preˆt a` Voter 2006, it is not encrypted under
the public key of a set of clerks but, like onionR under
the public key of the tellers. This is because onionR
is a re-encryption of onionL, created at the time of
printing the ballot form.
3.3 Creating the ballot form
We now present a mechanism for the distributed
generation of the onion pairs that will be printed on the
ballot forms. Throughout, we will use (exponential) El-
Gamal encryption and we will work in large subgroup
of Z∗p , of order q for which the discrete log problem is
deemed intracable. p a (large) prime. The aim is to
generate the entropy in a distributed fashion so that
no single entity has access to this information. Con-
sequently, no single entity can leak this information.
Furthermore, kleptographic attacks, [8], are avoided.
The first step is to generate a batch of Left Hand
onions using a set of l clerks in such a way that each
contributes to the entropy of the crypto seed and this
remains encrypted throughout. Consequently the can-
didate list, which is derived from the seed, remains
concealed and all the clerks would have to collude to
determine the seeds values.
We assume a set of decryption tellers who hold the
key shares for a threshold ElGamal primitive with pub-
lic key: (p, α, β). These will act much as the tellers of
the original scheme and will be responsible for the final
decryption stage after the anonymising, re-encryption
mix phase. This public key is known to the Clerks and
are used in the construction of the ballot forms.
An initial clerk C0 generates a batch of initial seeds
s0i . These seeds are drawn randomly from a binomial
distribution centred around 0 with standard deviation
σ. σ would probably be chosen to be of order n, the
number of candidates.
From these, C0 generates a batch of pairs of onions
by encrypting each s0i , actually in the form γ
−s0i , under
the Teller’s key:
(y1, y2) := (αx
0
i , βx
0
i .γ−s
0
i )
for fresh random values x0i drawn from Z
∗
p .
Notice that, for convenience later, we have en-
crypted the value γ−s
0
i for some generator γ of Z∗p
rather than encrypting s0i directly. The reason for this
will become apparent shortly.
The remaining l − 1 Clerks now perform re-
encryption mixes and transformations on this batch
of onions: each Clerk takes the batch output by the
previous Clerk and performs a combined re-encryption
along with an injection of fresh entropy into the seed
values.
More precisely, for each onion of the batch, the
jth Clerk Cj generates a new, random values x¯ and
s¯ and performs the following mix/transformation on
each onion of the batch:
(αx
j−1
i , β x
j−1
i .γ−s
j−1
i )
↓
(αx
j−1
i .αx¯
j
i , β x
j−1
i .β x¯
j
i .γ−s
j−1
i .γ−s¯
j
i ),
↓
(α(x
j−1
i
+x¯j
i
), β (x
j−1
i
+ x¯j
i
).γ−(s
j−1
i
+s¯j
i
))
↓
(αx
j
i , β
xj
i
R .γ
−sj
i )
where
xji = x
j−1
i + x¯
j
i
sji = s
j−1
i + s¯
j
i
The x¯ denote fresh randomisation values drawn from
from Z∗p generated by the Clerk during the mix. Sim-
ilarly the s¯ values are freshly created random values
except that these are again chosen randomly and in-
dependently with a binomial distribution mean 0 and
standard deviation σ. Having transformed each onion
pair in this way, the Clerk Cj then performs a secret
shuffle on the batch and outputs the result to the next
Clerk, Cj+1.
Thus, each Clerk performs a re-encryption mix along
with the injection of further entropy into the seed val-
ues s¯.
So the final output after l − 1 mixes is a batch of
onions of the form: {{(αxi , βxiR .γ−si)} where:
xi = xli, si = s
l
i
thus:
xi = Σli=1x¯
i, si = Σli=1s¯
i
The final si values will have binomial distribution
mean 0 and standard deviation σ
√
l.
As the seed values, and hence the candidate orders,
remain encrypted, none of clerks knows the seed val-
ues and only if they all acted in collusion could they
determine the seed values.
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Original Re-encryption Double mix
onion mix network onionL re-encryption onionR
O1 OL2 OR2
O2 OL3 OR1
O3 OL1 OR4
O4 OL5 OR5
O5 OL4 OR3
All tellers Printing authority
Table 6. Creation of the paired onions
Finally, we need to generate the corresponding RH
onions. For each LH onion, onionLi , a further clerk
creates a re-encryption onionHi . This pair of onions is
printed onto a ballot form as shown in fig ?. Assuming
this re-encryption is performed correctly, we see that
each ballot form now has a pair of onions printed on it
with the same plaintext seed value encrypted under the
teller’s public key, but with different randomisations.
These “proto-ballot form” can now be stored and
distributed in encrypted form, thus avoiding the chain
of custody problems mentioned above. The seed values
can now be revealed on demand by a threshold set of
the Registrars.
The output batch from each clerk is published on
the web bulletin board and this re-encryption mix net-
work can be audited, for example using partial Random
Checking. The purpose of these checks is to ensure that
all the clerks play according to the rules. We want to
avoid the possibility of, for example, the last clerk sim-
ply injecting the encryption of a fresh seed value, unre-
lated to the output of the previous clerks. This would
defeat the purpose of the distributed construction and
allow this final clerk to know the seed value.
The result of these re-encryption mixes is a batch
of encrypted onions which contain a random values
that can only be determined if a threshold set of the
tellers work together to decrypt the values. The pro-
cess of creating the onions that has just been described
is shown in Table 6.
3.4 Printing of the ballot form
For the printing of the candidate lists on the ballot
forms, there are two options: they can either be printed
by a central printing authority in advance and then be
distributed in a secure fashion to the appropriate places
in the constituency or the full form can be printed by
the machine in the voting booth. The first approach
setup suffers chain of custody problems while the latter
may allow the booth machine to learn too much.
Whoever is to print a form takes an onionL from
the available ones and re-encrypts this twice to form
onionR. This process should be secret, both onions
should be printed onto paper and then onionR should
be published on the web bulletin board in a shuffled
position such that it is not possible to determine the
pairing of onionL and onionR. If this printing is done
by a single printing authority then this authority can
print all ballot forms and then publish the onionRs
onto the web bulletin board as a full, shuffled batch.
As the onions are re-encrypted twice, random partial
checks can be used to audit this process without re-
vealing a full link between onionL and onionR.
3.5 Printing candidate list onto the form
When the voter enters the voting booth with her
ballot form she allows onionL to be read by a booth
machine. This can be facilitated by printing onionL as
a barcode. The booth machine submits this onion to
the tellers which work together to decrypt the contents
and return this to the booth machine which is then
able to print the candidate list in the left column of
the ballot form. Each teller keeps its own copy of the
entire, previously published, list of onionLs and when
one has been decrypted it is marked as used by each
teller. Each teller is thus sharing the responsibility of
ensuring that only those encryptions that should be
decrypted at a particular stage of the voting process is
decrypted at that stage.
When the candidate list has been revealed to the
voter she can make her mark(s) on the form. She now
detaches the two pages and places the lower page in an
envelope available in the booth. This envelop conceals
the lower page leaving only the serial number visible.
She now leaves the booth with the envelop and the
upper page and presents herself to the voting officials.
They verify that the serial number matches the one
issued to her and, if so, the serial number is removed
and the envelop is cast into the audit ballot box. The
top page of the ballot form constitutes her encrypted
Preˆt a` Voter receipt which is now scanned as usual and
posted to the WBB. She retains the original to use
this to check that the vote is included in the tally —
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by checking that it appears on the web bulletin board.
3.6 The decryption of the encrypted receipts
The encrypted receipts scanned in the polling sta-
tion are published onto the web bulletin board and all
voters are able to check that their receipts appear there.
When all tellers are satisfied that the election has ended
and all electoral rules have been followed they start the
decryption process, which is shown in Table 7. The first
teller, T1, takes all encrypted receipts and injects the
voter’s choice(s) into the onionR, using the homomor-
phic properties of exponential ElGamal. We call the
onion with the injected choice(s) onionI . Therefore:
onionI := onionR ∗ {V, r}PKT
The index number V indicates the position of the X
on the receipt. The result is:
onionI = {V − s, t}PKT
Thus, the I onion is the encryption of the V in-
dex minus the seed value. The offset φ of the can-
didate list printed on the ballot form is computed as
φ := s (mod n), where n is the number of candidates.
Thus, V − s (mod n) gives the index of the candidate
chosen by the voter in the canonical numbering of the
candidates.
No mixing is performed at this step: the I and R
onions are posted side-by-side on the WBB. That each
onionI is correcly formed w.r.t. onionR is thus univer-
sally verifiable. s is the seed hidden within the encryp-
tion.
We now perform a sequence of re-encryption mixes,
performed by a set of mix tellers. Each mix teller takes
the full batch of onionIs, re-encrypts each onion, shuf-
fles the batch and outputs to the next mix teller. The
output batch from each teller is published onto the web
bulletin board. The last output batch we call onionIn .
When all mix tellers have performed their re-
encryption mixes, the independent auditors confirm
that the mixes have all been performed correctly. This
might be done using partial random checking again or
perhaps Neff’s proofs of ElGamal shuffles, [11]. If the
auditors confirm that the mixes are correct, we can pro-
ceed to the decryption stage. If problems are identified
with the mixes, corrective actions can be taken. Thus,
for example, if one of the mix tellers is identified as
having cheated, it can be removed and replaced. The
mixes can be re-computed from the point onwards and
re-audited.
Once we are happy that the mixes have been per-
formed correctly, a threshold set of the decryption
tellers take over and cooperate to decrypt each onionIn .
No mixing is required at this stage and each step of
the decryption can be accompanied with a ZK proof of
correct (partial) decryption. The final, fully decrypted
values can be translated into the corresponding candi-
date values using:
candidatei = pi((s+ v) (mod n))
Where n is the number of candidates and pi is the
mapping that encodes the standard numbering of of
the candidates.
3.7 Audit of the paper trail
There are now a number of strategies for auditing
the election. One possible scenario is to perform a full,
manual recount of the election using the HRPAT. In
practise, due to inevitable errors with manual counting,
this will differ from the electronic count, even if the
later is exact and correct. If the difference is small and
well mithing the winning margin, this could probably
be disregarded.
An alternative scenario is to take a random subset of
the HRPAT ballots and, for each of these forms, the au-
ditor takes onionL and injects the V index to compute
onionJ , analogous to onionI previously described:
onionJ := onionL ∗ {V, r}PK
Of course, the J onions computed now will have dif-
ferent randomisations from the corresponding I onions
computed previously. However, we that, as long as
all computations have been performed correctly, the
sets of onionIs, onionIns and onionJs contain the same
plaintexts. In other words, The J onions should be re-
lated to the I by a re-encryption and shuffle. We could
test this hypothesis by performing a full PET match-
ing of the I and J onions or, perhaps more realistically,
performing some spot checks on a random selection.
To audit a particular encrypted receipt the audi-
tor asks the tellers to prove which onionI contains the
same plaintext as the onionJ it just computed. Using
a plaintext equivalency test (PET) a threshold set of
the tellers are able to prove, without revealing any se-
crets or the contents of the onion, which onionIn in the
published list of onions contains the same plain text as
the onionJ .
3.8 Candidate list auditing of used forms
The candidate list is printed on the bottom page,
which is retained in the ballot box so we can check that
the printing of the ballot form has been done correctly.
We do this by checking:
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Inject Re-encryption Plaintext
onionR choices onionI mix network onionIn Decryption vote
OR2 ⇒ OI2 OI5 ⇒ V5
OR1 ⇒ OI1 OI2 ⇒ V2
OR4 ⇒ OI4 OI3 ⇒ V3
OR5 ⇒ OI5 OI4 ⇒ V4
OR3 ⇒ OI3 OI1 ⇒ V1
Table 7. Decryption of the encrypted receipts
1. The candidate list is properly encapsulated in
onionL
This can be done for a randomly selected subset of
all ballot forms or, if needed, the whole set of ballot
forms. We thus achieve a higher level of auditability
of the printing of the ballot form than in previous Preˆt
a` Voter schemes. Note that the checks here are di-
rectly applied to the forms actually used to cast votes,
rather than to randomly selected forms that are then
discarded in a cut-and-choose protocol. In practice we
would probably want to retain such cut-and-choose au-
dits of ballots forms before and during the election in
order to detect problems early.
4 A DRE style interface
An interesting side effect of the introduction of this
human verifiable paper audit trail is that because of
the auditing of the printing of the ballot forms that
have been used to cast votes, as shown in Section 3.8,
it is possible to devise a Direct Recording Electronic
device (DRE) type of interface, also called in short a
touchscreen interface. In brief, this type of interface
is where the voter uses a computer to form her ballot,
perhaps by indicating her preference by tapping choices
presented on a monitor.
4.1 Motivation
While DRE type voting machines are notoriously
unsafe and unverifiable, they do have one advantage:
voters are able to use them very easily. They recognise
user interfaces from their personal computers and so
forth. Also, answering a series of questions or making
a series of choices on a series of screens by pressing the
choice with the index finger is easier than most other
input methods. Furthermore, these input methods can
be made accessible (by reading out the choices to the
voter wearing headphones, for example) and the ma-
chine can easily handle a large set of different ballot
forms, races and elections.
POST RETAIN
candidateB
candidateC X X
candidateA
onionL onionR
serial
Table 8. The ballot form printed by the DRE
4.2 Risks
The first issue to note is that when a voter uses a
DRE to construct the vote that will at some point be
cast, it is in the nature of the process for the machine
to learn the intention of the voter. In some cases this
can be a threat to the secrecy of the election. If the
DRE at any point learns the identity of the voter, or
colludes with someone who knows the identity of the
voter, the vote is no longer secret. In a case where the
machine does not learn the intention of the voter its
motivation to change the vote is limited as it can only
change the vote randomly.
Another important threat to the DRE style setup
is that the DRE may be able to insert a subliminal
channel in receipts that it prints, i.e. print more data
to the receipt than it is required to, in a way that
cannot easily be detected by any other party than those
colluding with the machine. For example, if the DRE
is required to select random values these may in fact
not be selected based on a random source but in such
a way as to encode a message to a colluding party.
4.3 The Preˆt a` Voter DRE voting ceremony
The voter casts a vote using a DRE style machine
by executing the following sequence of actions:
1. The voter identifies herself to poll station workers
and a serial number is marked against her name
2. An onionL is selected at random from the pub-
lished list and this is marked as used and stored
together with the serial number serial onto some
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medium (e.g. smart card or mag stripe) which is
given to the voter
3. The voter enters the voting booth and inserts the
medium into the DRE
4. The DRE reads the onionL from the medium and
submits it to the tellers
5. The candidate list(s) encapsulated in this onion is
returned to the DRE
6. The DRE presents the voter with all the choices
she is eligible to make
7. When the voter has confirmed all her choices the
machine prints a filled-out ballot form as shown in
Table 8 where onionR is a re-encryption of onionL
8. The DRE submits the encrypted receipt to the web
bulletin board and discards all data in its memory
9. The voter detaches the encrypted receipt from the
HRPAT part of the form and places the latter in
an envelope
10. The voter presents the envelope to the polling sta-
tion official who checks that serial visibly matches
that assigned to this voter — if not required by
legislation to remain intact, serial is detached and
destroyed
11. The envelope is dropped into a sealed, transparent
ballot box
4.4 Risk limitation
The risks of using DRE systems identified in Section
4.2 are limited somewhat by the auditing possibilities
of the scheme presented here. Using the cryptographic
relationship between the onionL, onionR and the can-
didate list we can determine that the DRE has not
cheated in the printing of the candidate list as well as
that it has not cheated in the placing of the voter’s
marks on either part of the ballot form.
To audit this the election authority may select a ran-
dom subset of all submitted HRPAT ballot forms and
ask the tellers to reveal the contents of onionL. Using
the public key PKT of the tellers it can be checked
that this does in fact correspond to the candidate list
printed on the form. This has now proved that the
voter has indicated her preferences based on the cor-
rect candidate list.
The auditors then go on to check that, as shown
in Section 3.7, the voter’s mark on the HRPAT ballot
form is the same as the one on the receipt that the
Re-encryption
onionL mix network onionM
OL2 OM2
OL3 OM1
OL1 OM4
OL5 OM5
OL4 OM3
All tellers
Table 9. Another re-encryption mix of onionL
voter holds. The voter, of course, can check on the web
bulletin board that the electronic copy of her receipt
corresponds to the printed copy that she holds.
The probability by which a cheating DRE will be
caught is thus related to the number of forms that are
audited and the selection of the forms to audit can be
made in such a way as to further minimise the like-
lihood that the cheating DRE will be able to remain
undetected.
5 Discussion
5.1 Teller oracle mode
As with some previous Preˆt a` Voter schemes it is
unfortunate, but a necessity, for auditing (and in this
scheme also for candidate list printing purposes) for
the tellers to be available in so called oracle mode. The
availability of the tellers can be safeguarded by a set of
tellers (T11, T12, T13) emulating a single teller (T1) in a
threshold fashion. This is the focus of future research.
5.2 Voter choices differ between pages
As the voter must make her marks on the form in
the privacy of the booth, it is possible for a malicious or
coerced voter to introduce different marks on the two
pages. To resolve this and to prove that the marks were
made differently on each sheet by the voter the tellers
can take the list of onionLs and run them through a re-
encryption mix to form a list of onionM s, as shown in
Table 9. It is then possible to use the PET strategy to
prove which onionM contains the same information as
the onionL, the extension of which is that the bottom
page is valid but the voter’s mark does not match. If
the tellers, when prompted, find that onionL with the
voter’s choice Bbottom does not have the same plaintext
as onionR with the choice Vtop injected then they prove
that onionL has the same plaintext as onionM to show
that the marks are different on each of the pages.
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